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The digital economy, characterised by goods exhibiting high instantiation and 
low reproduction costs frequently created and distributed over multisided plat-
forms, poses challenges for the pricing of products and services. As convergence 
occurs between applications and transport, flexible ways of pricing internet access 
and content are being developed. One frequently used pricing strategy is ‘zero-
rating’—where traffic for specific applications is not counted against the ‘cap’ in an 
internet user’s monthly access plan. This pricing strategy has drawn much criticism 
from net neutrality advocates, but it is far from clear that the policy is harmful. 
Using an economic analysis based upon relaxing assumptions in the simple model 
of perfect competition, so that it more closely reflects the complex internet eco-
system, we assess the extent to which it is plausible for zero-rating to be used to 
harm competition, consumer welfare and incentives for application innovation. We 
develop five questions to assist inquiry into the potential harm or benefits arising, 
which can be applied by competition authorities, regulators and the firms con-
cerned to assist in sorting the cases less likely to be harmful from those that warrant 
further investigation.
Keywords: zero-rating, economic analysis, regulation, competition, strategic 
interaction
1. Introduction
The digital economy, characterised by goods exhibiting high instantiation 
and low reproduction costs frequently created and distributed over multisided 
platforms, poses challenges for the pricing of products and services. Unlike for 
most physical goods, it no longer follows that the optimal price for any individual 
item will be a simple function of its cost of production, or even that the individual 
consuming the product or service should be the one that pays for it [1].
Information goods providers are increasingly adopting strategies subsidising 
the consumption of information goods by bundling them with other goods, or by 
utilising multisided platforms whereby revenues in excess of costs raised in trans-
actions with customers of one product type (or side of the platform) are used to 
subsidise below-cost purchases by consumers of another product type (or side of 
the platform). For example, consumers receive ‘free’ (or discounted) newspapers, 
television and radio channels when advertising revenues offset the costs of provid-
ing the printing and broadcasting infrastructure required for the content to reach 
consumers. ‘Virtuous cycles’ arise as advertising revenues subsidise the costs of 
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readers or viewers accessing content, thereby increasing consumer welfare, at the 
same time as having more readers and viewers increases the value to advertisers 
and hence the price that platform operators can charge them [2]. So long as there 
is careful balancing of demand elasticities on both sides of the platform, having 
prices varying from marginal cost on both sides can be both profit- and welfare 
enhancing [3, 4, 24].
Such practices have, however, proved particularly challenging for regulators and 
competition authorities entrusted with the pursuit and protection of competitive 
markets for the long-term benefits of consumers. Successfully engaging in above-
cost pricing in at least one market requires the firm to have some degree of market 
power, while using the surpluses to subsidise another potentially alters the competi-
tive dynamics in that market as well [5]. Inevitably, the interests of consumers of one 
product must be traded off against those of another. Furthermore, in the context 
of increasing disintermediation of once-integrated firms and their replacement by 
complex contractually co-ordinated supply chains for the relevant products and ser-
vices, it is no longer obvious that one specific firm or even one market is the appro-
priate focus for attention. While a mandate clearly exists for competition authorities 
and regulators to be interested, it is far less clear that their historic precedents and 
inquiry methods based on historic structure-conduct-performance (SCP) models of 
industrial organisation established to deal with single firm or markets and non-infor-
mation goods are suitable for governing commercial interactions in the new context.
The complexities are highlighted by ‘zero-rating’. This occurs when internet 
service providers (ISPs) do not count the data traffic used to service specific 
applications (supplied typically by third-party content and application providers—
CAPs—who may also be using advertising revenues to subsidise production costs) 
against the data traffic ‘cap’ allowed in an internet user’s access (subscription) plan. 
Data transmissions for these applications are effectively ‘free to the user’, whereas 
data transmissions serving other applications incur an effective positive price. 
Regulators and telecommunication authorities in many jurisdictions have been 
required to adjudicate allegations of the use of zero-rating to harm competition 
in both the ISP and CAP markets, and thereby to cause harm to consumers collec-
tively, and disproportionately to different consumer groups. Telecommunications 
regulators have been lobbied to impose rules prohibiting its use entirely, or at least 
permitting it only in very restricted circumstances.
To date, regulators and competition authorities have generally responded cau-
tiously, by eschewing outright prohibition of zero-rating in favour of case-by-case 
analysis, as was explicitly required in the United States Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) subsequently repealed 2015 Open Internet Rule [6]. Following 
repeal, case-by-case jurisdiction has persisted under generic competition law 
overseen by the Federal Trade Commission, as occurred prior to 2015, and has 
always prevailed in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, where no specific 
net neutrality regulations have been introduced. In contrast, the European Union’s 
approach, encapsulated in its 2016 Net Neutrality Regulation, is more prescriptive.
Nonetheless, even with case-by-case evaluation, regulators and competition 
authorities face many difficulties in assessing economic harms and benefits. Not 
least is defining the relevant market(s). Benefits and harms may accrue in multiple 
markets, many of which may be far-removed from both that in which the firm 
engaging in the pricing practice is deemed to be operating (e.g., in CAP markets 
not ISP markets) and the territory over which the relevant authority has jurisdic-
tion (e.g., a CAP operating from a different country to the ISP). Further decision-
making complications exist due to extensive use of bundling of internet and content 
access with other products and services (e.g., with fixed and mobile voice applica-
tions, and pay television, in classic ‘triple’ and ‘quadruple’ play subscriptions), and 
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the fact that little may yet be known about consumer valuations and preferences in 
markets for products that are comparatively new [7]. While the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) has endeavoured to address 
this complexity by issuing a set of guidelines for member state regulators to assist 
in implementing the European Net Neutrality Regulation [8], they have proven 
problematic. Their focus on legal compliance with the directive rather than detailed 
assessment of the economic harms and benefits in different circumstances has 
resulted in considerable variation between member state regulators’ interpretation 
and application of the rule, creating both controversy and uncertainty about the 
acceptability of zero-rating pricing strategies across the notional single communica-
tions market to which the commission aspires [9].
Given the levels of economic complexity invoked by zero-rating, and the lack 
of theoretical and empirical evidence to date to inform both firms seeking to adopt 
the practice and regulators and competition authorities seeking to maintain fair and 
competitive markets (on balance, most that has been produced finds the practice 
NOT harmful), the development of some general economic principles for evaluat-
ing its effects is indicated. This chapter represents a first step in this direction. The 
contribution is five questions, which can be used as a preliminary filter to assess 
the likelihood of a specific instance of zero-rating being harmful to total welfare, 
thereby necessitating either caution on the part of a firm potentially implementing 
it, or justification on the part of competition authorities and regulators contemplat-
ing expending their scarce resources on a more intensive investigation.
We begin by outlining the general arguments for and against the use of zero-
rating. Next, we summarise key economic characteristics of the internet ecosystem 
in which zero-rating offers are being made. Then, beginning with the models of 
perfect competition upon which theories of competitive harm were developed 
in classical SCP thinking, we demonstrate how successively relaxing the model 
assumptions when it is applied to the commercial interaction between ISPs and end 
users leads to the identification of circumstances where zero-rating may be more or 
less harmful to total welfare. The theoretical economic methodology used for this 
inquiry draws upon and extends the similar approach used by Greenstein et al. [21] 
and Gans and Katz [10, 11] in their inquiries into specific examples of zero-rating. 
The result is the five questions, which are summarised in our conclusion.
2. Zero-rating, net neutrality and competitive harms
Calls for the banning of zero-rating offers have arisen in the context of wider 
advocacy for increased regulation of ISPs to impose a particular view of an internet 
where ISPs are required to treat every data packet equally—in regard to both techni-
cal and financial characteristics. Calls for ISPs (but not the providers of content and 
applications used on the infrastructure) to operate in this neutral, non-discrimina-
tory manner—so-called net neutrality—derived from Wu’s [12] seminal paper.
Particular concerns have been voiced about ISPs charging some content and 
applications providers (CAPs) but not others to deliver their traffic to end consum-
ers, even when those payments are not associated with traffic prioritisation (so 
fall outside the so-called ‘hard’ network neutrality regulations [13] precluding 
such behaviour). ISPs, however, are continually looking for new revenues in order 
to finance the newer, more capable networks required to transport a burgeoning 
volume of content and application data between CAPs and end users, in addition to 
winning new customers and amortising general network costs.
Some neutral internet proponents (e.g., [14, 15, 28]) have argued that ‘zero-rated’ 
internet access plans, frequently offered by mobile providers, should be prohibited. 
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These plans do not count data used for selected (‘zero-rated’) applications against the 
data downloading ‘cap’ specified within the monthly access fee. End users face a lower 
effective price for using the selected application than for other applications that are not 
‘zero-rated’. The ISP may or may not charge the selected CAPs to recover the costs of 
delivering their data to end users. ‘Zero-rated’ plans are seen by net neutrality propo-
nents as a form of unfair price discrimination1 against those internet users who do not 
access the selected content. It is also argued that when ISPs selectively zero-rate data 
relating to large established CAPs, smaller and newer rivals will be foreclosed, thereby 
harming incentives for application innovation, regardless of whether or not ISPs charge 
CAPs. A further argument is that application variety will be harmed because smaller, 
newer providers may not have the resources to pay ISPs to zero-rate their traffic, lead-
ing to their applications being eschewed by end users preferring the zero-rated options.
Others, however (e.g., [10, 16, 17, 25, 27]), contend that preventing all instances of 
zero-rating will necessarily rule out some cases (e.g., those analogous to advertising in 
newspapers) where payments on both sides of a two-sided market may be necessary 
for both an application and the additional infrastructure needed to service demand for 
it to be commercially viable in the first place. They also suggest that zero-rating will 
facilitate higher internet use in total (and therefore higher welfare) than if payments 
were restricted to only one ‘side’ of the internet platform. The potential welfare gains 
from higher internet use may be especially valuable in developing countries where the 
ability to pay for additional data use is very low [18]. They argue for a more nuanced 
approach, where each case is considered on its merits, so that the interests of all par-
ticipants in highly complex internet-enabled ecosystems can be assessed [9, 19, 29, 30].
To date, no consistent view has emerged amongst regulators and competition 
authorities of what constitutes anti-competitive use of zero-rating. In the United 
States, much press has been directed at T-Mobile’s zero-rating of its Binge-On 
application, but the FCC has found no harm. In Europe, the Belgian regulator 
found Proximus use acceptable according to the BEREC guidelines [31], and two 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)—Austria and Croatia—found zero-rating 
acceptable when assessed against BEREC’s commercial criteria. However, the Dutch 
NRA found Deutsche Telecom had infringed in zero-rating its free music service. 
The decision was struck down on appeal, but on grounds that the NRA decision 
exceeded EU law, rather than on its commercial merits.2
3. The internet ecosystem and zero-rating
Zero-rating offers take place in a complex internet-enabled ecosystem consisting 
of multiple intertwined two-sided platforms, of which ISPs are just one of many 
in the commercial chain linking senders and receivers of data [20, 21, 32]. Figure 1 
illustrates how in this ecosystem, payment flows need not necessarily follow data 
flows. The systemic interaction of payments and data flows means that actions at any 
one segment of the ecosystem can have material consequences at any other part.
1 A distinction needs to be made between legal definitions of discrimination—where two people with 
observable differences are treated differently (e.g., racial or gender discrimination) and economic dis-
crimination—where two people with different economic characteristics are treated differently (e.g., where 
those with low willingness-to-pay are charged a low price and those with high willingness-to-pay a high 
price). The latter case may frequently lead to a more efficient outcome. However, in the former, the indi-
viduals may have identical economic characteristics, so charging different prices is not welfare-enhancing.
2 Autoriteit Consument & Markt, “ACM Not to Appeal Ruling on Net Neutrality | ACM.Nl,” News, May 
23, 2017, /en/publications/publication/17267/ACM-not-to-appeal-ruling-on-net-neutrality.
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3.1 Complex interactions
Net neutrality advocates assert that innovation at the CAP ‘edge’ of the ecosystem 
unconditionally dominates innovation at the ISP core. In this view, ISPs’ sole com-
mercial functions are to serve the internet data transmission requirements of their end 
users. ISPs should not have commercial interactions with CAPs—thereby precluding 
any possibility that selected CAPs can pay ISPs to prioritise (i.e., discriminate against) 
traffic related to their applications over that of their rivals. By extension, any arrange-
ments whereby ISPs discount the charges relating to specific applications (i.e., zero-rat-
ing) are seen as price discrimination. Both practices are seen to discriminate amongst 
CAPs, so are antithetic to the objective of promoting the internet ecosystem as an 
engine of innovation [22]. Van Schewick [15] uses this argument to question the effi-
cacy of T-Mobile’s zero-rating of content on Binge-On, as do critics of Facebook’s Free 
Basics. Indeed, Lemley and Lessig go so far as to suggest that ISPs should not charge 
CAPs for data delivery as a form of subsidy for application development activities.
In contrast, ISPs claim that they have been required to build ever-more-capable 
networks (for example, from 2G to 3G, 4G and now 5G mobile, and fixed fibre 
and wireless) to serve the vastly increased demands placed on them to deliver 
ever-larger amounts of data at ever-faster speeds to meet the demands of specific 
applications [26]. A handful of application types—notably audio and video stream-
ing—require vastly more sophisticated network capabilities than others—for 
example, simple websites. As not all consumers use these applications equally, and 
some applications—for example, those relating to time-critical bilateral interac-
tions—need to be treated differently from others—e.g., one-way streamed data—
then some degree of discrimination (both in terms of traffic management and 
pricing, such as charging CAPs in some instances as well as ends users) is essential if 
their networks are to be operated efficiently and effectively.
Figure 1. 
The internet-enabled ecosystem.
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Regulators and competition authorities are charged with promoting competi-
tion in each of the relevant markets in order to protect the long-term interests of 
consumers. This dynamic welfare criterion is predicated upon the assumption that 
the long-term interests of consumers in each of these markets are a suitable proxy 
for the long-term interests of the ecosystem as a whole. Thus, balance is required 
between short-term and long-term factors. Furthermore, what is optimal at one 
time of the ecosystem lifecycle may not be optimal at another [33, 34]. To the extent 
that social preferences may override the economic considerations, then the costs of 
imposing those preferences must be recognised in both the total welfare foregone, 
and the transfers that those preferences engender between ecosystem stakeholders. 
Moreover, a single stakeholder may participate in the ecosystem in multiple capaci-
ties, and these may vary over the ecosystem lifecycle. The dilemma for regulators 
and policy-makers is to decide what to take into account when developing a frame-
work for assessing cases of zero-rating, and deciding how and when to intervene.
3.2 Derived demands
The dilemma is exacerbated because end-users’ demands for ISP services are 
not determined solely by their own interaction. An ISP connection is of no value to 
an end user if it is not used to access internet applications. ISPs operate two-sided 
platforms connecting CAPs and end users. The relevant products for any zero-
rating inquiry are the complex bundles of internet access and application use that 
end users consume. Internet connection value cannot be considered in isolation—it 
is dependent upon the value the consumer places on the applications accessed. The 
ISP may supply some of these applications, but for the most part, consumers’ value 
of the connection is contingent upon being able to access a vast range of applica-
tions provided by third-party CAPs.
A nontrivial observation arising is that, for the most part, ISPs do not have 
strong incentives to impede their consumers’ access to the preferred applications, 
for fear of losing them—and their revenues—to rival ISPs [21]. If favouring one 
application harms access to or use of another, then likewise this will likely reduce 
both the number of ISP customers and the ability of the relevant CAP to earn sub-
scription and advertising revenues. Ipso facto, this reduces the incentives for ISPs to 
use pricing to strategically foreclose selected third-party applications—especially 
those consumers valued highly—unless they are compensated by the CAP. However, 
as the market power (measured by the consumer base) of highly valued CAPs 
vastly exceeds that of any individual ISP, and they have very wide (global) reach 
whereas ISPs are geographically specific, it is most unlikely that they will engage in 
contracting in each of the vast number of local geographic ISP markets in order to 
foreclose their CAP rivals. It cannot be discounted that locally specific CAPs might 
find such a strategy advantageous with regard to a rival facing the same geographic 
limitations.
3.3 Complex tariffs
ISPs can charge consumers a flat fee, a usage-based fee or a combination of the 
two for internet access. Consumers’ internet access purchases are determined by 
trading off the fixed price paid for access and any usage charge against the benefits 
of accessing and utilising applications. Menus of two-part tariffs bundling access 
and usage charges are generally welfare enhancing relative to a single flat-rate or 
solely usage-based tariff as they allow users with different valuations associated 
with different usage levels of even a single application to self-select the tariff that 
gives them most surplus [35].
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A zero-rated tariff applied to a specific application is simply a tariff with no 
usage-based component—that is, a flat fee. Flat fees are most advantageous for 
those with the highest expected usage, (e.g., video gaming) as they will utilise 
it up to the point where no further benefits will be obtained. This is necessarily 
more than if usage is charged at marginal cost (noting that network congestion is 
a significant externality proportional to utilisation that is imposed by users when 
utilising applications). If the higher costs associated with higher usage levels are 
to be recovered in user fees, a single flat-rate tariff will be higher where usage is 
higher that when it is lower. Metered tariffs (including plans with flat-rates within 
a given data cap, that rise as the data cap increases) are an efficient means by which 
ISPs may recover revenues from each consumer rising in proportion with the costs 
that usage imposes on the ISP (including the costs of congestion that lower service 
quality for all users).
3.4 Heterogeneous end users
However, metered tariffs will arise in practice only if consumers are heteroge-
neous in their valuations of application usage. If all consumers value their con-
nections identically, then there will be one tariff that is efficient for all users, and 
there will be no incentive for ISPs to offer any other tariff. Consumers’ valuations of 
internet application usage are inherently heterogeneous because different users will 
prefer to use different applications for different purposes. Some will prefer applica-
tions requiring high usage (e.g., video streaming) while others will prefer applica-
tions with lower resource demands (e.g., web browsing, email). Even consumers 
preferring a single application will vary in their use of it due to personal preferences 
and resource constraints—for example, time to watch streamed video and the cash 
to pay for the connection.
Consequently, internet access as sold by ISPs is not a homogeneous good—it 
varies with the application preferences of the consumers using it. Consumers with 
higher valuations for a single application will consume more resources than those 
with lower valuations. If metered tariffs are intended to recover higher revenues 
from higher-using consumers of a single application, then offering a zero-rated 
tariff for that application is inconsistent with the ISP’s objective to recover its costs 
in usage fees. Assuming that the ISP does not recover the revenues lost from zero-
rating application usage from the application provider, and it costs the same to 
deliver a unit of each application to the end user, then it is strategically illogical for 
the ISP to charge for the usage of one application and zero-rate usage of the other. 
Costs remain unchanged, but revenues will fall.
Hence, in the simplest case, as zero-rating by an ISP discounts revenues received 
from selected end users on the consumer side of the ISP platform, it must neces-
sarily be associated with compensatory revenue streams—for example, higher fees 
charged to non-selected users, charges on the CAP side of the platform, or revenues 
from other sources, such as taxation or advertising—if in the long run the ISP 
wishes to remain solvent.
4. Competition: relaxing the assumptions
The principal arguments against zero-rating promulgated by net neutrality 
advocates rest on the one-sided logic that all end users should pay the same price for 
internet access, regardless of whether the market for the product in question con-
forms to the assumptions of perfect competition. In this model, the marginal unit 
supplied will be sold at its marginal cost of production, and this cost will determine 
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the price paid for all other units sold. This leads to a statically efficient outcome, 
with maximum total welfare.
However, for this to be achieved, other specific market conditions must be 
met. Importantly, the product sold must be perfectly homogeneous, there must 
be perfect information, no transaction costs, no externalities, and no barriers to 
firms entering or leaving the market. There must be perfectly divisible output (i.e., 
no scale economies). All participants are price-takers—that is, no firm can charge 
more than the efficient price and remain in the market, and consumers must pay 
that price if they value the product at that price or above.
Requiring all units to be sold at the same price does not of itself make a market 
more competitive (i.e., render the perfectly competitive outcome) unless all of the 
other conditions are met. In this section, we will demonstrate that as practically 
none of these assumptions prevail in the complex market for internet access dis-
cussed in the previous section, simplistic calls to prevent zero-rating are insufficient 
to guide decision-making.
First, we show that when the assumption of homogeneous goods is relaxed, it 
is most unlikely that zero-rated tariffs can be used to foreclose rival applications. 
Instead, we demonstrate that requiring the same price to be charged for accessing 
products costing different amounts to produce obscures crucial underlying dif-
ferences in costs on the supply side and user preferences on the demand side. This 
leads to our first three questions to be posed by those undertaking case-by-case 
assessments of zero-rating examples. Next, we relax the assumptions of perfect 
information and absence of transaction costs in the exchanges between ISPs and 
their end consumers, and their effects on barriers to entry for new CAPs and ISPs. 
This leads us to question the competitive positioning of the party objecting to an ISP 
using zero-rating prices—and our fourth question for assessors. It also leads to our 
final consideration—how the presence of transaction costs creates barriers to entry 
that lead to entrants and not incumbents favouring zero-rating policies. This leads 
to our fifth question, regarding the strategic options available to CAPs and ISPs that 
render financial transactions between them an adjunct to zero-rating that makes the 
strategy not only pro-competitive but also welfare-enhancing.
We note that in this analysis we are considering only instances of pricing of 
data transfer as a strategy for zero-rating. We do not consider cases of payments 
for data prioritisation. The examples we consider therefore have the appearance of 
the price discrimination to which Wu [12] and Van Schewick [15] raise objections, 
rather than being artefacts of paid data management, which are considered in other 
literature.
4.1 Relaxing the constraints: homogeneous products and heterogeneous users
In net neutrality discourse, ISPs could strategically zero-rate a selected appli-
cation to steer end users away from using another application and towards the 
favoured one. This could occur if the ISP is also the CAP for the favoured applica-
tion, whereby it could foreclose another ISP offering a similar application, or to 
foreclose a rival stand-alone CAP. However, such foreclosure can only occur only 
if the end users perceive the applications as perfect substitutes: that is, the applica-
tions are homogeneous.
If the two applications offer materially different value propositions to end 
consumers (i.e., the assumption of homogeneous products in the perfect competi-
tion model is relaxed), then the zero-priced application will not be able to force 
the positive-priced one from the market so long as there are consumers who prefer 
the positive-priced one over the zero-rated one by more than the discount embed-
ded in the zero-rating offer [11]. As demonstrated above, as end users are also 
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inherently heterogeneous in their content preferences, it is quite unlikely that the 
requisite conditions for foreclosure will occur unless the applications concerned are 
indistinguishable.
The inability for ‘free’ offerings to foreclose those with a positive price is 
observed with broadcast television and newspaper providers. Free-to-air television 
and free newspapers have not foreclosed pay television and newspaper subscrip-
tions. Indeed, some consumers willingly consume both, even when some of the 
content overlaps, because the additional value offered by the pay version is suf-
ficiently high enough that it overcomes the price differential. Arguably, the pres-
ence of the two different newspaper forms has led to greater content variety, with 
subscriber newspapers providing a professional journalist-based news service, and 
free newspapers relying more upon content generated by readers (e.g., local school 
and sports reports) and advertisers.
This leads to our first question to be posed about zero-rating offers.
Question 1. What very close or perfectly substitute applications accessible over 
the ISP’s connection, costing the same to deliver, are likely to be foreclosed by the 
zero-rated application(s)?
The closer are the non-zero-rated application(s) to the zero-rated one(s) in 
the perception of the end users, then the more likely it is that the non-zero-rated 
applications will be crowded out. However, there are very few applications meet-
ing this requirement that are truly close substitutes. For the most part, CAPs such 
as Netflix and Hulu are not close or perfect substitutes for each other because they 
contain different bundles of content for which end users have distinct preferences. 
The applications themselves are differentiated; even if it costs the ISP the same to 
deliver a Hulu movie and a Netflix one of equivalent specifications. If a consumer 
preferring Netflix is not prevented from paying the higher usage fee to watch Hulu 
content if the content available only on Hulu is sufficiently highly valued, then Hulu 
will not be foreclosed, even in respect of the subset of Hulu-preferring consumers 
on the discriminating ISP’s network.
It might be a concern, however, if the applications in consideration were, for 
example, two identical cloud storage applications. The zero-rated application will 
have an unequivocal advantage over the non-zero-rated one, leading to all consum-
ers with a non-zero valuation of using cloud storage opting for the lower-cost one. 
However, for foreclosure to occur, it is necessary for the applications to be undif-
ferentiated—that is, homogeneous products. Foreclosure of differentiated products 
will be a function of the degree of differentiation—the more similar they are, the 
more likely it is that foreclosure will occur.
The logic applied in this simple illustration leads to the conclusion that without 
some non-neutral pricing signals, over-much (inefficient) investment in CAP vari-
ety is possible if equalising the prices faced by consumers and application providers 
conceals underlying real differences in costs and user preferences.
4.2 Equalising prices conceals underlying cost and valuation differences
Assume now that the two applications are perfectly homogeneous, but one 
actually costs less to deliver than the other. This could be because the ISP has been 
able to customise the delivery of one application within its own networks so that it 
costs less (or causes less congestion) than an otherwise-equivalent one that has not 
been customised. It could also be that one class of applications can be processed 
via a different operational process that is less costly, as occurred in Australia and 
New Zealand in the mid-1990s, when the internet was first becoming popular. 
At the time, international bandwidth capacity on the PACNET sub-oceanic cable 
was constrained. Due to asymmetric data flows, Australian and New Zealand ISPs 
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purchased PACNET capacity under transit arrangements rather than peering. 
Traffic to and from end consumers over PACNET was more costly to handle than 
traffic handled under local peering arrangements. The original retail internet plans 
metered international (PACNET) traffic by volume, but offered unmetered (i.e., 
zero-rated) local traffic.
In this instance, zero-rating low-cost local traffic but metering high-cost 
international traffic reflected real differences in underlying costs. Zero-rating that 
diverts consumers’ usage of substitutable applications towards lower cost applica-
tions raises efficiency.
This leads to our second question for regulators and adjudicators.
Question 2. Does usage of the zero-rated applications actually cost the ISP less 
than equivalent usage of non-zero-rated applications?
If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then zero-rating would be less harmful 
to total welfare than the alternative of requiring all usage to be charged at a single 
price. Under the two-price arrangement, more usage than efficient would be made 
of the low-cost application, and the high-price usage tariff would have to be above 
cost to subsidise the additional low-cost usage. Arguably, this could lead to some 
low-cost applications surviving that would not otherwise be viable if their usage 
was charged at cost—that is, inefficient over-supply of application variety [11].
However, the alternative of a single positive usage price that does not signal the 
different underlying costs will lead to more usage of the high-cost application than if 
it was charged at cost. This usage would have to be subsidised by users of the low-cost 
application. Increasing the price of using the low-cost application above its cost to 
subsidise the high-cost usage leads to less usage of the lower-cost application, and at 
the margin some consumers will give up their internet connections entirely because 
they no longer receive utility higher than the combined price of access and usage. 
Without the fixed revenues of these low-cost consumers to offset the higher usage costs 
of the consumers paying below cost, the average usage cost per unit of traffic handled 
increases, leading to even higher usage fees and a second depressing effect on the usage 
of and fees generated by low-cost users. That is, a ‘waterbed effect’ emerges [23].
Hence, zero-rating of applications with lower costs than non-zero-rated applica-
tions is not equivalent in its effects to zero-rating applications with the same costs as 
their zero-rated counterparts. The difference is material. In a perfectly competitive 
market, it is necessary for the price signals associated with lower costs to be sent 
to consumers so that efficiency-raising changes in purchasing behaviours can take 
place. Concealing information about cost differences (e.g., by averaging the prices 
for two or more applications) prevents consumers making efficiency-raising choices.
We note, however, that in the New Zealand case, discounting local applications 
did not crowd out content from foreign origins because they were not substitutes. 
Indeed, foreign content and applications were overwhelmingly preferred by end 
users, even though they were more costly.
4.3 Differentiated price and product offers to low-valuers
We now turn to the argument of pro-net neutrality advocates that zero-rating 
should not be allowed when it enables free or discounted access to a narrow range 
of internet applications or applications with some functionality removed, when 
the ISP charges a higher fee for unrestricted access to the ‘full service’ applications. 
This restriction is claimed for ISPs, even though the same practice is widespread 
in the software industry—for example, Microsoft’s Office available as a low-price, 
restricted student version and a high-price, full service professional version.
The advocates claim that restricted offer users cannot participate equally with 
unrestricted users in a supposed ‘right’ to access the full potential benefits of all 
11
Strategic Use of Zero-rating of Mobile Data
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84130
applications and content available on the entire internet. Any arrangement that 
allows differentiated access to that content is seen as an infringement of that right. 
Zero-rating that reduces access charges in exchange for reduced functionality is 
therefore ‘unfair discrimination’. Free Basics, where potential internet users in 
developing countries are offered free access to a restricted range of applications, but 
can access the full versions when paying a monthly internet access subscription, is 
frequently cited as such an infringement.
In principle, zero-rating access to a restricted-functionality application is no 
different to an application provider choosing to make some content available freely, 
and releasing other content only when some other obligations—for example, 
paying a fee, or sharing personal information—have been met. Access providers 
can set different tariffs for using different versions of the application if they really 
do invoke lower costs (e.g., stripped-down versions with lower data consumption), 
as per question 2. However, these versions may also be associated with compensa-
tion from the CAP to the ISP, especially if the low-cost version stimulates more 
low-value consumers to purchase connections, increasing the value available to the 
CAP from advertising. Furthermore, it is the application provider and not the ISP 
who makes the decision about restricting the application range to self-selecting 
end users. Preventing application providers from offering these discount arrange-
ments appears at odds to the net neutrality argument that edge providers and not 
ISPs exercise control over internet content. If the range of content is restricted by 
applications providers—for example to foreclose other application providers—then 
it would seem more properly a matter to be addressed by generic antitrust provi-
sions rather than internet access regulation.
Moreover, the presumption that all end users should pay identical prices to 
access the same applications ignores economic realities. The expectation that all 
consumers pay the same price for a product is an artefact of perfectly competitive 
markets. If all consumers pay the same price, then those with higher valuations of 
the bundle receive more surplus than those with lower valuations. Perfect equity in 
access prices for homogeneous good cements in place extreme inequities in surplus 
distribution. Price discrimination (different prices for the homogeneous good) 
effectively transfers surplus from high-valuers to low-valuers and leads to higher 
total consumer numbers without reducing total welfare. Where scale economies are 
present (as occurs in both ISP services and most CAP products, as they are mostly 
digital products with near-zero reproduction costs), then total welfare increases 
as well. Product differentiation (e.g., offering a subset of functionality for a lower 
price) leads to higher consumer numbers in total than with a single price for the 
undifferentiated good. Price discrimination and product differentiation therefore 
both appear consistent with (or at least are not per se harmful to) increased product 
variety, larger total numbers of internet users and ongoing innovation in the inter-
net ecosystem. That does not mean that the practices might not, in some circum-
stances, lead to negative outcomes. Rather, it reinforces the merits of a case-by-case 
analysis rather than prescriptive prohibitions.
Price and product differentiation are important ways of enabling individuals 
with low valuations of internet use, or facing significant financial constraints, 
to become internet users, The former case occurs in mature markets, when the 
last-remaining individuals have not yet connected because the value they place on 
the connection is less than even a very modest single price charged. The latter case 
arises in developing economies, where income constraints pose significant bar-
riers to purchase for large numbers of individuals. While subsidising connection 
fees through a tax and redistribution system may induce purchase in the former 
group, subsidising via applications may be more effective because the application 
is the primary determinant of the value derived. It also offers a superior means of 
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subsidising in the latter case, because surpluses generated by users in developed 
economies can be transferred via the application and access bundle to subsidise 
those in developing economies. Thus, wealth transfers across national borders can 
occur without the need for government intervention.
This gives rise to our third question for regulators and adjudicators.
Question 3. Is zero-rated access to a subset of applications primarily intended 
to increase the number of individuals using the internet?
The purpose of this question is to separate out instances of zero-rating that are 
more likely to lead to positive network effects arising from larger total numbers of 
internet connections from instances that may arise from other motivations—for 
example to change the range and usage of applications by individuals already 
purchasing internet connections.
4.4 Relaxing the constraints: perfect information and no transaction costs
Having considered the implications of relaxing the constraints of product (and 
consumer) homogeneity, we now turn to the assumptions of perfect information 
and zero transaction costs that attend the perfect competition model, and their 
effects on barriers to entry and exit.
Imposing the assumption of consumer homogeneity reduces the amount of 
information available to both ISPs and CAPs to customise their offerings to individual 
consumer preferences. Information that would otherwise have been efficiently sig-
nalled or screened in customised offers can only be obtained subsequently by other 
means—inevitably with higher transaction costs. In the long run, this would seem to 
impose impediments to, rather than incentives for, the development of new applica-
tions and contracting arrangements. That is, banning zero-rating because the prac-
tice may pose entry barriers for new application providers must be balanced against 
the entry barriers that will be created if information about underlying consumer 
heterogeneity that would be efficiently signalled, screened and shared if zero-rating 
proceeds cannot emerge due to regulatory intervention banning the practice.
While banning zero-rating has been justified by the potential for ISPs to raise the 
costs for new application providers, it is equally plausible that banning prevents both 
application developers and ISPs from learning about and creating offers that cater to 
these underlying differences. Thus, existing ISPs and CAPs might prefer the infor-
mation not to be surfaced if in doing so, opportunities were created for new entrants 
to take advantage of consumer heterogeneity to create new offers, attract consumers 
away from the exiting providers and appropriate a disproportionate share of the new 
consumers yet to purchase internet connections. Likewise, existing end users obtain-
ing high surpluses under a single price might be unwilling to share those surpluses 
with new consumers who will participate only with implicit subsidies.
This gives rise to our fourth question for regulators and adjudicators.
Question 4. Who has requested that an instance of zero-rating be investigated?
If the request has come from existing ISPs, then it is plausible that the motiva-
tion may be to foreclose competitive entry by rival ISPs. If it has come from existing 
CAPs, then the motivation may be to foreclose competitive entry by new applica-
tions provides. If it comes from existing end users, then the motivation may be to 
lock in existing surpluses and not have to share them with new or future internet 
consumers. On the other hand, if the request to investigate has come from new or 
potential ISPs or CAPs then the claim that it creates an entry barrier may be cred-
ible. It seems most unlikely that a non-end user would ask for an inquiry about 
the legality of a zero-rating offer that would cost less than the alternative price. 
Similarly, it is also unlikely that a low-valuing existing end user who would be 
better-off using the restricted zero-price offer would request an inquiry.
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4.5 Positive search costs and barriers to entry
In markets with heterogeneous products, consumers with different preferences, 
and information asymmetries that make it costly, if not impossible for consumers 
to identify the attributes of the products or the fit with their preferences before 
they have been consumed, a more appropriate model for analysing interaction is 
monopolistic competition. In this model, within a range of products there will be 
one that will be the best match for a given consumer with given preferences. At any 
given price, this product gives the consumer the highest possible surplus.
However, the consumer cannot identify in advance, which is the best match. Nor 
can the provider accurately identify the best consumers for the offer. The consumer 
can select one offer at random—so long as the surplus from this purchase is not 
negative, the consumer has gained at least some increase in surplus. Where the 
consumer will use a service multiple times (or make multiple purchases), the gain 
from purchasing the same product/service is known. There may be a better match 
available (higher gain) from buying a different product next time—but there is 
also a risk that the different product is a worse match than the existing one. The 
consumer could have had higher surplus if instead the first product had been pur-
chased. There may also be switching, learning and adjustment and other investment 
(transaction) costs associated with each product. Buying from a second supplier 
means a second set of these costs—which is avoided if second and subsequent 
purchases are made from the first supplier. Together, these comprise ‘search costs’ 
(a form of transaction costs). The larger are the search costs, and the smaller is the 
expected benefit of the second product over the first, the less likely it is that the 
consumer will try to find a better match, even though there is definitely a better one 
out there. Thus, high search costs lead to suppliers having some market power over 
their existing customers—akin to monopoly—even though there are many different 
variants of the product—competitors—available for consumers to choose from.
Almost certainly, the markets for internet application adoption and usage are 
monopolistically competitive. Customers make investments in using specific appli-
cations (learning costs, emotional investments, etc.) that make them reluctant to 
try new variants. When a new application enters a market where customer prefer-
ences are already well established, overcoming these high search costs is likely one 
of the most significant barriers faced. The more mature is the application market, 
the more established are these preferences and the harder it will be to overcome 
them. Even if the new product is superior to all others in the market, customers will 
be reluctant to try it, because they do not know that it is better for them until they 
have tried it. If the same price is charged for the new and existing products, the 
new product will attract very few new customers, because of the high search costs 
customers face. In this case, the only way that the new product will attract new 
customers is by charging less than the existing products—that is, undertaking to 
meet the search costs incurred by the customers. For this reason, new products in 
markets exhibiting these characteristics are typically introduced with free trials.
However, if a new internet application is offered free of charge to consumers, because 
the costs are recovered from advertising or other sponsored revenues (e.g., donations, 
tax funding), it is not possible to discount the application cost to encourage switching. 
The only way that potential customers’ search and switching costs can be reduced is by 
reducing the internet access charge. Hence, zero-rating may be the only viable way of 
inducing existing consumers to try a new application. Not being able to offer zero-rating 
thus constitutes an entry barrier to new applications seeking to compete with established 
ones. Just as in question four, it will be existing applications providers, and not new 
entrants, who would prefer that zero-rating not be allowed. However, it is important to 
note that there are two different reasons for coming to this conclusion.
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This gives rise to our fifth question for regulators and adjudicators.
Question 5. Do consumers of the zero-rated application and its rivals make 
payments to applications providers separate from their payments to ISPs?
If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then the party with the most plausible rea-
son to use a zero-rating strategy may be a new entrant. Preventing zero-rating then 
may lead to barriers to entry that protect incumbents. If the answer is “yes’, then the 
situation is more complex, and further investigation is warranted.
5. Conclusion
In sum, therefore, the economic analysis reveals that the strategic motivations for 
using zero-rating are complex, and turn on a wide range of contextual factors, across 
all parts of the internet ecosystem. The five questions posed here tease out some fac-
tors to inform all ecosystem participants, but especially policy-makers and regulators.
The questions both draw upon, and highlight the fact that, the internet ecosys-
tem is as complex, dynamic and adaptive system that defies simplistic definitions, 
and cannot easily be analysed or governed using simple frameworks developed for 
an environment with simple, linear relationships where cash flows closely followed 
product flows. To the extent that the ecosystem closely intertwines the activities of 
ISPs and CAPs with end users, it is no longer sufficient for regulators and competi-
tion authorities to consider zero-rating as solely an activity governed by the strategic 
intentions of ISPs alone. The questions posed in this chapter are not intended to sub-
stitute for detailed case-by-case analysis based upon economic principles of welfare 
maximisation, but rather stand as a complement to the frameworks currently being 
used in regulatory and judicial processes to assess likely harms and benefits.
There is much still to learn about competition and regulation of this complex 
ecosystem, but the questions here go some way to ensuring that scarce resources are 
used to investigate the cases most likely to be welfare harming.
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